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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000875

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TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [EAC](#)

SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/05/2005

REF: SANAA 0863

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajewski convened an EAC meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and review security measures taken by the Embassy and community. The RSO briefed the EAC about another grenade attack in central Sanaa (see paragraph 5), earlier in the day, against a military truck, near the Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador followed the EAC with a Town Hall Meeting for the community reported SEPTEL. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, and RSO. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) RMAS informed the EAC that no new information had been received regarding the threat noted in EAC report REFTEL. No other attendee had further information regarding the threat.

3. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed on going security measures and the Ambassador noted good compliance among Embassy sections in varying arrival times to work. Additionally, the EAC discussed the fact that several TDY visits seen as non-essential had been delayed pending better understanding of the threat. EAC review of Emergency Action Plans determined that tripwires remained constant and had not escalated beyond the category identified by the EAC in REFTEL. The EAC noted that one tripwire did apply from the Authorized Departure category as follows: Credible, specific, and non-counterable information of a terrorist threat or planned attack against Americans or other western citizens or interests, to include international schools.

4. (S/NF) The RSO advised EAC members that the following actions had been taken to ensure best security practices were applied in light of the threat:

- RSO met with Sanaa International School's Director. SIS according to the review has 8 American children in attendance (none from the U.S. Embassy) and approximately 40 other western nationalities among a student body of about 140 students. RSO advised the EAC that he found campus security well run, with a ram-resistant drop bar and armed sentries on the perimeter. SIS's Director briefed RSO that he would implement a move safe plan for students arriving to school in coming days. RSO also reviewed architectural plans with the School Director for an upcoming Phase II Soft-Target, upgrade designed to prevent intruders as well as to provide vehicular standoff and a public access center for screening staff and visitors.

- SD residential coverage was adjusted to cover Embassy leadership positions as well as the Embassy Employee Shuttle, while continuing spot coverage of other employee residences and the route from the Sheraton to the Embassy. Persons currently covered included the DCM, USAID Director, COS, DATT, FPD, and an OMC staff officer.

- RSO advised the EAC of a review of the Yemen American Language Institute perimeter security and access control. RSO informed the EAC that YALI has a good public screening activity with the newly upgraded Public Access Center, but the perimeter security is lacking. (RSO COMMENT: ROYG officials have prevented finalization of perimeter upgrades due to an ongoing land dispute between the YALI owner and a property across the street.) RSO recommended consideration by the EAC that YALI operations be suspended until ROYG allows placement of ram-resistant barriers and drop-bars to prevent a vehicle from forcing itself on YALI. The EAC took no action on the proposal.

- RSO informed the EAC that he had received a call from the Sheraton Hotel manager in Aden, who informed him that they had received a dramatic increase in perimeter security improvements from the Minister of Interior who placed ram-resistant barriers and sentries on the approaches to the hotel. Additionally, the EAC was advised the hotel manager informed the RSO that a 20-meter standoff would be implemented on the hotels perimeter. RSO noted guests'

independent observations that perimeter control had improved dramatically with use of drop bars and vehicle inspections.

(RSO COMMENT: One ARSO is in Aden as of this report to review security with the hotel owner and manager.)

- EAC members were informed that the RSO reviewed the Ambassador's close protection detail and ordered the increased use of &ghost motorcades⁸, suspension of non-essential COM travel, and a dramatic change in routes completely avoiding usual choke-points and rush hours.

- The EAC was advised of a house-by-house review by MOI on 4 April 2004, in response to RSO request for marked police units or gun trucks on the streets line of sight of Embassy residences either in a roving or fixed fashion. EAC was informed that a high-level delegation of MOI officers conducting the review promised to increase surveillance of routes to and from the Embassy and in front of residences and increased the number of sentries to the residential perimeter from two to six.

- EAC was informed that Embassy Employee Shuttle schedules were being reviewed and where necessary modified to ensure change in travel times and routes.

15. (S/NF) EAC discussed conflicting information regarding the attack against a military vehicle near Babal Yemen, on 29 March 2005. The DCM advised the EAC that the MOI had informed him that it was an internal military dispute that lead to the attack; however other sources have reported a connection with the fighting going on in Saada. The RSO informed the EAC about another similar grenade incident that occurred earlier in the day near downtown Sanaa at about 1200 noon, 5 April 2005, near the Ministry of Defense. RSO sources reported that a man dressed in clothing typical of the Believing Youth Movement was seen throwing a grenade through the open window of a military pick-up on a street named Al-Qaida. The grenade was said to have been thrown back out of the window by the intended victims, who then gave chase to the attacker. During the chase the assailant threw another grenade that destroyed a truck and may have killed one pursuer. The chase ended when the man described as having five grenades on his person, threatened to throw a third grenade, which broke off the chase.

16. (U) The meeting ended with no further recommendations. Khoury